ABOUT THIS BOOK

一致的思维方式：关于一种哲学美德的研究

根据康德的观点，‘一致的思维方式’的原则是“时刻与自己的思考保持一致”（《判断力批判》, § 40）。正如康德自己强调的，这种旨在始终保持一致性和连贯性的思考是难以实现的。同时，一致性，即不与自己相矛盾，通常被理解为人类理性的一项甚至是基本原则，人类在思想和行动上都致力于此。然而，大多数人不仅很难理解自己假设的后果，而且只有很少数人愿意去考虑这些后果。因此，思考自己假设的后果可以被视为一种特殊的美德，似乎只为少数人保留。即便是那些负责批判性审查论点的人，也往往避免提出不受欢迎的假设后果和让悖论显现出来。相反，他们躲在所谓的常识背后，这种常识几乎不以严格的一致性而著称。

另一方面，可以在许多被视为经典的哲学作者作品中找到真正‘一致的思维方式’的例子。也许正是这个事实，使他们成为了哲学经典。例如，康德为了道德的缘故，准备将被不公正迫害的人交给迫害者，即使对于同情他的解释者来说，这也是一个前所未有的挑衅。霍布斯或斯宾诺莎等人在其哲学作品中严格阐述从自己的系统前提不可避免地得出的结论，看起来同样令人反感。基于这样的例子，‘一致的思维方式’可以被认为是哲学家的一种特殊美德。至少，这是我们对哲学的期望——它认真对待自己的基本原则，承认它们有时不愉快的后果，从而为自己和他人提供进一步的，甚至可能是令人震惊的反思材料。

作为一种哲学美德，‘一致的思考’不仅在哲学本身中证明了其价值，而且在经典哲学文本的解释和批评中也是如此。往往是解释者揭示了哲学理论概念中的——假定的或实际的——不一致性。因此，各种哲学关切可以归纳为康德的‘一致的思维方式’关键词下。最后但同样重要的是，这也强调了研究经典对整个哲学的价值，因为正是从这些经典中，我们可以获得哲学一致性的最佳例子。毕竟，哲学一致性可以而且必须被学习。在这方面，经典作为模范和几乎取之不尽的灵感源泉。而且，正因为它们的假设有时会带来令人恐惧的后果，它们不仅仅作为一种被假定为已克服的哲学教条主义的例子。相反，与之打交道提供了概念工具来质疑我们自己基本哲学态度的自明性，这种态度我们太快就视为理所当然、健康或准自然的，一致而且没有任何思考禁令，这种态度才能被视为值得哲学的‘思维方式’。

Consistent Way of Thinking. Studies on a Philosophical Virtue

According to Kant, the principle of a 'consistent way of thinking' is "to think in agreement with oneself at all times" (Critique of Judgment, § 40). As Kant himself emphasizes, it is undeniable that such thinking, which aims at consistency and coherence throughout, is difficult to achieve. At the same time, unanimity, i.e. not contradicting oneself, is generally understood as one or even the basic principle of human rationality par excellence, to which man is committed both in thought and in action. However, most people not only find it very difficult to understand the consequences of their own assumptions, but only very few are prepared to consider them at all. Thinking through the consequences of one's own assumptions can therefore be seen as a special virtue that seems to be reserved for only a few. And even those whose business it is to critically examine the arguments put forward all too often shy away from drawing the unwelcome consequences of cherished assumptions and allowing the paradoxes to come to light. Instead, they hide behind supposed common sense, which is hardly notorious for strict consistency.

Examples of a truly 'consistent way of thinking', on the other hand, can be found in numerous philosophical authors who are considered classics. Perhaps it is precisely this fact that has made them philosophical classics. The fact that Kant, for example, is prepared to hand over the unjustly persecuted to his persecutors for the sake of morality is an unheard-of provocation, even for interpreters who sympathize with him. Many of the consistent conclusions of Hobbes or Spinoza, who rigorously set out in their philosophical works the results that inevitably follow from their own systematic presuppositions, seem equally objectionable. On the basis of such examples, a 'consistent way of thinking' can be assumed to be a particular virtue of the philosopher(s). For that, at least, is what we expect from philosophizing - that it takes the principles on which it is based seriously, acknowledges their sometimes unpleasant consequences and thus provides itself and others with material for further, perhaps even outrageous, reflection.

Consistent thinking' as a philosophical virtue proves its value not only in philosophizing itself, but also in the interpretation and criticism of classical philosophical texts. It is often the interpreters who uncover the - supposed or actual - lack of consistency in a philosophical theoretical concept. Various philosophical concerns can therefore be subsumed under the Kantian keyword of a 'consistent way of thinking'. Last but not least, this also underlines the value of studying the classics for philosophy as a whole, because it is precisely from these classics that we can obtain the best examples of philosophical consistency. After all, philosophical consistency can and must be learned. In this respect, the classics serve as a model and an almost inexhaustible source of inspiration. Moreover, precisely because of the sometimes frightening consequences that result from their assumptions, they do not merely serve as examples of a supposedly overcome philosophical dogmatism. On the contrary, dealing with them provides the conceptual means to question the self-evidence of our own basic philosophical attitude, which all too quickly appears to us as self-evident, healthy or quasi-natural, consistent and without any prohibitions on thinking, which alone can be considered a 'way of thinking' worthy of philosophy.

AUTHOR/EDITOR

Andree Hahmann, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;

Stefan Klingner, Georg August University Göttingen, Germany.